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Hegemony – the way in which dominant groups in society maintain their dominance 
by securing the spontaneous consent 
of subordinate groups, including the 
working class, through the negotiated 
construction of a political, ideological 
and economic consensus which 
incorporates both dominant and 
subordinate groups.
Historic bloc – the degree of historical 
congruence between material forces, 
institutions and ideologies and more 
specifically the alliance of different class 
forces politically organised around a set 
of hegemonic ideas and structures that 
give strategic direction and coherence 
to its constituent elements. 
The sky too is folding under you
And it’s all over now, baby blue
The concept of hegemony was 
developed by Antonio Gramsci, writing 
whilst imprisoned by Italian fascists, to 
solve the problem which had beset all 
European radicals, particularly Marxists, 
for decades; why the subordinate 
working class failed to overthrow the 
dominant capitalist class even after its 
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own oppression and exploitation had 
been endlessly revealed, why even 
then they failed to follow Shelley’s 
impassioned words written in 1819:
Rise, like lions after slumber
In unvanquishable number!
Shake your chains to earth like dew
Which in sleep had fallen on you:
Ye are many – they are few.
It needs to be acknowledged that, 
even as it provides a conceptual 
basis for resolving this conundrum, 
hegemony remains a somewhat 
mysterious process, something which 
has always bothered some Marxists 
who want to retain some form of 
economic determinism. Gramsci saw 
the capitalist state as being made 
up of two overlapping spheres, a 
‘political society’ (which rules through 
force) and a ‘civil society’ (which rules 
through consent). He saw civil society 
as the public sphere where trade 
unions and political parties gained 
concessions from the bourgeois state, 
and the sphere in which ideas and 
beliefs were shaped, where bourgeois 
‘hegemony’ was reproduced in cultural 
life through the media, universities and 
religious institutions to ‘manufacture 
consent’ and legitimacy. The political 
and practical implications of Gramsci’s 
ideas were far-reaching because he 
warned of the limited possibilities of 
direct revolutionary struggle for control 
of the means of production; this ‘war of 
attack’ could only succeed with a prior 
‘war of position’ in the form of struggle 
over ideas and beliefs, to create a new 
counter-hegemony.
Over eighty years have passed since 
Gramsci’s original formulation and we 
are able, with the benefit of extended 
hindsight, to see how hegemony 
itself often carries seeds of its own 
instability in ways which sometimes are 
reminiscent of the way Marx believed 
that capitalist economic formations 
carried within themselves the seeds 
of their own destruction. The problem 
is that such instability is both more 
complex and also more unpredictable 
than any simple economic crisis.
Hegemonic domination is, of course, 
not confined to the capitalist era. It can 
be seen in some form, often religious, 
extending back to the Pharaohs. 
However, since capitalism shows 
great instability and shifts it is useful 
Hegemony and all 
that stuff
What is clear is that what we are going through 
is not simply an economic crisis, though certainly 
the financial crisis precipitated by the neoliberal 
hegemony and its debt-fuelled underpinning 
is key, but also a crisis of democracy whose 
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to engage in a quick gallop through 
the last hundred and fifty or so years 
even though this risks considerable 
elision and gross simplification. This 
gallop is confined to Europe and 
America where the processes of such 
domination can be most clearly seen 
and does have a particular focus on 
Britain. The application of the idea of 
hegemony in post-colonial and post-
Communist societies remains as work 
in progress given the relatively short 
period since domination by simple 
force was superseded by other forms 
of control.
The obvious starting point in Europe 
is 1848, the Year of Revolution, when 
there were popular uprisings in various 
forms across over 50 countries. Britain 
had its own, more decorous, form of 
uprising in the shape of Chartism. 
Virtually all of these uprisings were 
defeated, often with great bloodshed 
but it clearly marked the moment in 
which the dominant class accepted 
that the repressive techniques which 
had marked class control had to be 
modified. The use of these in Britain 
in the thirty years after Peterloo is 
wonderfully illustrated in paintings of 
the mass Chartist gatherings in remote 
hill sanctuaries held where no militia 
horses could pursue them.
No one seems to have any good 
understanding of just how or why there 
was such simultaneity across countries 
when there is no real evidence of any 
overt linkages. It does illustrate the 
spontaneous aspect of the formation of 
any new hegemony. At the time, the 
bloody defeats in 1848 were seen as 
major setbacks for developing European 
socialist movements but they set in 
train the process of negotiation into 
what might be called the democratic 
hegemony, which included the 
concession of manhood suffrage, trade 
union rights and the development of 
parties representing the working class 
though always with unevenness and 
retreats. This long period of sixty years 
or so in which consensual democracy 
replaced physical repression is what 
would have informed Gramsci’s views 
on hegemony and still represents 
the longest period of relative social 
stability in the capitalist era, surviving 
as it did the unification of Italy and 
Germany, several wars including civil 
war in the USA and the rise of mass 
social democracy and trade unions. 
It was destroyed by WWI without 
any real signs of systemic instability 
epitomised by the complete failure of 
revolutionary Marxists like Luxembourg 
and Liebknecht to organise any 
international opposition to war based 
upon working-class solidarity. It 
produced a rather rose-tinted memory 
of the epoch epitomised by the 
American novelist Scott Fitzgerald’s 
description in Tender is the Night in 
1934 in which an American couple 
visit a WWI battlefield. It remains 
as a perfect evocation of just how 
complex is the formation of hegemonic 
domination:
“See that little stream – we could 
walk to it in two minutes. It took the 
British a month to walk to it — a 
whole empire walking very slowly, 
dying in front and pushing forward 
behind. And another empire walked 
very slowly backward a few inches a 
day, leaving the dead like a million 
bloody rugs. No Europeans will ever 
do that again in this generation…
The young men think they could 
do it but they couldn’t. They could 
fight the first Marne again but not 
this. This took religion and years 
of plenty and tremendous sureties 
and the exact relation that existed 
between the classes. The Russians 
and Italians weren’t any good on 
this front. You had to have a whole-
souled sentimental equipment 
going back further than you could 
remember. You had to remember 
Christmas, and postcards of the 
Crown Prince and his fiancée, and 
little cafés in Valence and beer 
gardens in Unter den Linden and 
weddings at the mairie, and going 
to the Derby, and your grandfather’s 
whiskers.”
“General Grant invented this kind 
of battle at Petersburg in sixty-five.”
“No, he didn’t – he just invented 
mass butchery. This kind of battle 
was invented by Lewis Carroll and 
Jules Verne and whoever wrote 
Undine, and country deacons 
bowling and marraines in Marseilles 
and girls seduced in the back lanes 
of Wurtemburg and Westphalia. 
Why, this was a love battle – there 
was a century of middle-class love 
spent here. This was the last love 
battle.”
This war broke the long-lasting 
‘democratic hegemony’ and ushered 
back the old fear announced in 1848 
that:
A spectre is haunting Europe –
the spectre of communism. All the 
powers of old Europe have entered 
into a holy alliance to exorcise this 
spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich 
and Guizot, French Radicals and 
German police-spies.
Where is the party in opposition 
that has not been decried as 
communistic by its opponents in 
power? Where is the opposition that 
has not hurled back the branding 
reproach of communism, against the Here they are in 1842 at the Basin Stone near Todmorden.
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more advanced opposition parties, 
as well as against its reactionary 
adversaries? (Communist Manifesto)
Of course Marx and his allies 
were, at the time, quite wrong in their 
estimation of the power of revolution 
and of their own words. According to 
Eric Hobsbawm, By the middle 1860s 
virtually nothing that Marx had written 
in the past was any longer in print.1 Only 
in one respect were Marx and Engels 
proved right; the ability of opposition 
parties to split based upon accusations 
of leftism and rightism. However, in 
one way, 1919 was the postscript to 
1848. The Russian revolution opened 
up a concrete vision of a new form 
of society; the social democratic 
opposition parties in most of Europe 
finally split into their revolutionary and 
reformist factions and there were short-
lived workers states set up in Hungary 
and southern Germany. But only in 
Mongolia did the Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party succeed in 1921 in 
forming a long-lasting communist state. 
Instead, 1919 ushered in nearly twenty 
years of cultural and political upheaval, 
economic collapse, war and what 
would today be termed authoritarian 
populism, otherwise known as fascism. 
Even Britain was not immune to the 
upsurge of the old organs of repression 
with naval gunboats moored in both the 
Clyde and Mersey at various moments. 
The final devastation was WWII.
The end of WWII brought in 
what can be termed the ‘welfare 
hegemony’, a consensual agreement 
between a conjunction of forces, some 
of which seemed deeply hostile to 
capitalism including huge Communist 
parties in Italy, France and Finland as 
well as the revival of Labour in Britain 
based upon a left-wing programme. 
The ‘historic bloc’ developed in the 
agreement allowed these apparently 
hostile forces to be neutered and 
even incorporated inside the capitalist 
system. The essentials of this agreement 
need little rehearsal, basically the use 
of Keynesian economics to counter 
cyclical economic recession and the 
guaranteeing of certain minimum 
welfare levels. Of course, at the same 
time, capitalist Europe had been much 
diminished, a process that continued 
through to 1948 with the incorporation 
of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet 
bloc and the continuance of forms 
of authoritarian fascism in Spain and 
Portugal. This new hegemony applied 
only to a core Europe of about seven 
countries plus the defeated countries 
of Germany, Italy and Austria. It was 
also adopted, though in a modified 
form, in the USA.
The twenty-five or so years of 
this welfare hegemony have often 
been thought of as the golden years 
of capitalism when both recession 
and unemployment as well as the 
threat of communist revolution 
seemed to have been banished in 
favour of steady economic growth 
benefitting all sections of society. The 
inherent problem of this pact was the 
increasing penetration of the state 
into the functioning of capitalism and 
the increasingly powerful position 
of organised labour within this state 
intrusion. This included not just 
nationalisation of much basic industry 
but also the use of various forms of 
planning and economic direction to 
steer the economy. These included 
such as the French economic plans 
which ushered in the so-called Trente 
Glorieuses, only briefly faltering with 
the événements in 1968, the Italian 
Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, 
a Fascist institution taken over in 
postwar Italy and much admired by 
British social democratic economists, 
as well as the various forms of state 
intervention in Britain, mostly involving 
nationalisation but also the National 
Economic Development Council set up 
in 1962 by a Conservative government 
followed by the ill-fated national plan 
of 1965 under Labour.
The inevitable economic problems 
created by this penetration were 
summarised in 1975:
The most general contradiction 
of capitalism remains that between 
the growing social character 
of production and the private 
appropriation of the product 
through the market.
In the period following the 2nd 
World War, this contradiction 
has developed in a number of 
different spheres, each marked 
by the increasing encroachment 
of conscious pubic control over 
the decreasingly effective market 
mechanism.
In the area of human life, this 
process of increasing public control 
has been able to achieve definite 
social and economic progress, but 
in each such area, the problem of 
the increasing incompatibility of the 
market mechanism with the social 
and economic needs created by 
the continuing development of the 
productive forces, has caused new 
and intractable crises to develop. 
These crises are insoluble because 
each new encroachment on the 
sphere of the market leaves less and 
less room for manoeuvre in what is 
left of the market economy.2
In Britain, these crises were 
particularly marked by very high 
inflation rates created by intensive 
union action to raise wages. 
However, this characterisation did 
to an extent draw upon the need for 
Marxist economists to find economic 
underpinning for social upheaval. 
What was occurring throughout Europe 
was more complex than any simple 
economic explanation. These, after 
all, were the anni di piombo in Italy, 
the Red Army Faction in Germany and 
the wave of various kinds of student 
agitation throughout Europe. 
An analysis later in the 1970s looked 
at the almost simultaneous events in 
this decade:
The exact cause of the great 
POLITICS
The key hegemonic 
point of neoliberalism 
was the alleged 
return of power to the 
individual consumer, to 
allow individual choice 
as against state-dictated 
spending and the 
removal of power from 
institutions such as the 
trade-unions and local 
authorities which were 
portrayed as impinging 
on the power of the 
individual.
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international explosion of 1968 is 
not clear, though it was a social 
and political phenomenon without 
parallel, transcending even the Year of 
Revolution, 1848, in its international 
scope. There was certainly an 
element of international emulation 
heightened by the use, almost for the 
first time, of virtually instantaneous 
satellite TV transmissions. The images 
of that year still stand to mind: the 
NLF flags on Hue Citadel; clenched 
fists of black athletes in Mexico 
City; the CRS visors and shields 
appearing out of teargas clouds in 
Paris; bewildered Russian tank crews 
harassed by Prague crowds; the 
ruins of Detroit ghettos. Yet each of 
these events and the accompanying 
discord of a hundred cities – even 
London, where a Vietnam march in 
November 1968 was seriously seen 
in the leader column of The Times as 
being the precursor to armed uprising 
– was its own end point, the result 
of apparently dissimilar movements 
within quite different societies.
We do not propose to analyse 
this international shock wave except 
to note one factor. All the popular 
movements we have mentioned were 
failures, at least in the dimension of 
physical repression. Even the Tet 
Offensive was accounted a material 
defeat at the time. But each, with 
one exception, set in motion 
powerful forces for change, which, 
in some cases, are still progressing. 
The Tet Offensive broke the power 
of the US government to convince 
its own people that the price was 
worth the gain and initiated a deep 
questioning of the effectiveness of 
political democracy in controlling 
the actions of governments. In Italy 
and France, the Communist Parties 
began their climb out of the political 
wilderness. In the USA, the struggle 
against racism was given a political 
dimension that it had never achieved 
before. What they all represented 
– save the Tet, which lies outside 
this circle except in its indirect 
effects on the American people – 
was a break with certain aspects of 
bourgeois hegemony rather than a 
challenge to state power. And what 
they demonstrated more effectively 
than a thousand theories was that 
such challenges could emerge out 
of popular movements; that they 
need not be mediated by any strata 
of intellectuals or party groups; that 
bourgeois hegemony within the 
political and ideological structures 
of society is not absolute.3
Applying a more Gramscian analysis, 
we suggested a more subtle explanation 
than the one quoted above for the 
dominance of the ‘welfare hegemony’ 
and the seeds of its downfall:
This notion of an ongoing conflict 
between structurally antagonistic 
modes of production co-existing 
within the same social formation is 
crucial to the subsequent argument. 
It is also necessary to be clear that 
the dominant mode of production 
is not identical with the progressive 
mode of production. The dominant 
mode may lack the capacity 
to resolve the major social and 
economic issues of the day from 
within its own resources. In order 
to sustain itself and to integrate 
both individual and social needs at 
various levels of society into a stable 
synthesis it may have to rely on 
partial and contradictory borrowings 
from outside itself.
The previous example of 
post-war Britain illustrates how 
British capitalism was enabled to 
survive and even, by the standards 
of its own historical past, to 
flourish, by incorporating some of 
the dynamics of socialism. It is this 
phenomenon, the pre-emptive 
borrowing of elements of the class 
enemy's programme in order to 
forestall revolution, for which 
Gramsci coined the phrase "passive 
revolution". The borrowed elements 
do not, however, become totally 
submerged. They do not completely 
lose their progressive character by 
virtue of being harnessed to the 
dominant mode. Because they derive 
ultimately from an antagonistic 
mode of production they always 
retain a threatening potential and 
remain a continuing focus of political 
and ideological conflict. It is hard to 
see how the experience of the UK 
since the onset of acute economic 
crisis in 1973-4 can be understood 
in any other terms. On every front 
of economic and social policy, from 
the control of the National Health 
Service to the control of the money 
supply, the most fundamental 
principles of social organisation and 
action have been locked in combat. 
That this combat has been fought 
out in the idiom of reform rather 
than revolution should not obscure 
its importance.4
The outcome of this breakdown 
of ‘welfare’ hegemony did, however, 
demonstrate that the victory of what 
subsequently became known as 
neoliberalism was not inevitable and 
that it was not total. In 1983 in Britain, 
the victory of what later became 
known as Thatcherism could probably 
have been resisted, at least for a time, 
had the Labour Party not conveniently 
committed suicide in 1981 just as 
it had done fifty years before in 
1931. The key hegemonic point of 
neoliberalism was the alleged return of 
power to the individual consumer, to 
allow individual choice as against state-
dictated spending and the removal of 
power from institutions such as the 
trade-unions and local authorities 
which were portrayed as impinging 
on the power of the individual. The 
final part of the agreement was the 
progressive privatisation of parts of the 
economy, including social housing, 
once seen as necessarily state-owned, 
with generous discounts offered to 
purchasers of shares or freeholds. One 
key statistic summarises the basis of 
this hegemonic agreement: in 1979, 
UK household debt was at the record 
low of 29.20 percent of GDP whilst in 
2016 it was a little above 87% down 
from its record high of 97% in 2010 
but increasing. Accompanying this was 
a prolonged attack on government 
expenditure from a postwar high of 
over 48% of GDP at the end of the 
1970s down to a low of 36% in 1998.5
The rise in household debt was 
common throughout the capitalist 
world. In 1995, household debt as a 
proportion of household disposable 
income was about 38% in Italy and 
105% in Australia. The corresponding 
figures in 2014 were 89% and 201%. 
Only in Germany has household debt 
been kept relatively stable resulting 
in Germany’s current position as the 
economic arbiter of Europe with Angela 
Merkel as the good-housekeeper.(6) 
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In the USA, it will be recalled that it 
was the sub-prime mortgage scandal 
which precipitated the financial crisis 
of 2008, essentially the provision of the 
mortgages necessary to buy houses well 
beyond the ability of households to pay.
In one important way, the neoliberal 
hegemony differed from the previous 
two in that it was based upon a lie 
whereas both the democratic and 
welfare hegemonies were based upon 
at least partial truths. Real advances 
were provided in democratic rights 
after 1848 and there were real gains 
in welfare provisions after 1945. 
What neoliberalism provided was 
access to personal debt finance to 
promote consumption whilst allowing 
monstrous growth in real inequality to 
those with power either corporate or 
political. (A recent article in The Thinker 
has shown how much corporate power 
has increased in this period.7) A recent 
startling revelation about this is that just 
8 people have as much wealth as the 
bottom 50% of the world’s population8. 
Real wages have effectively stagnated 
for most working people whilst top-
earners have soared away. This is shown 
in the figures for the USA of the share of 
national income taken by the top 1%. 
This bottomed out in 1973 at 8.9% and 
has since under neoliberalism risen to 
21.2% in 2013. Similar numbers can be 
found for most countries. 
The neoliberal hegemony was also 
concerned to reduce the fear and 
uncertainty which had been created 
in the turbulent 1970s essentially by 
reducing the power of trade-unions 
and other organs of social dissent. 
The apparently total victory of 
neoliberalism was marked by the failure 
of opposition forces to adequately 
develop any counter-hegemony; 
particularly any way to bring together 
the various social movements of the 
1970s and established political agents 
which effectively controlled access to 
channels of electoral democracy. This 
failure was most marked in Italy which 
had both mass social upheaval and 
powerful left political parties.  
A paper by the controversial Italian 
sociologist, Antonio Negri,9 (later 
described by a conservative  Italian 
President as ‘a psychopath’ who 
‘poisoned the minds of an entire 
generation of Italy's youth’ — so he 
can’t be all bad) analyses this period 
and, in particular, the failure of the 
Italian Communist Party’s ‘historic 
compromise’ which was, in effect 
the one effort to produce a counter-
hegemony, however flawed.
In various ways, the collapse of 
the welfare hegemony and the rise of 
a neoliberal hegemony was mirrored 
throughout Europe though in different 
ways and in varying degrees. The 
notorious tournant de la rigueur by 
the Mitterand government in 1983, 
accompanied by the expulsion of the 
Communist Party from government, 
is the most obvious example, a turn 
essentially derived from the same 
problem which had confounded 
British Labour governments in the 
1970s, persistent and rising inflation. 
The historic bloc created in all cases 
was essentially based upon fear, that 
the perceived chaos created by strong 
trade-unions would destroy hard-won 
savings and prevent individual success.
We are now in the midst of the 
fourth hegemonic crisis in the capitalist 
era if one counts the turbulent 1840s. 
It may or may not be encouraging for 
progressive politics that they seem 
to have come at steadily decreasing 
intervals; very roughly 60, 30 and 20 
years. It is certainly not encouraging that 
war has often, in the past, been part of 
the breakdown. What is clear is that 
what we are going through is not simply 
an economic crisis, though certainly 
the financial crisis precipitated by the 
neoliberal hegemony and its debt-
fuelled underpinning is key, but also 
a crisis of democracy whose outcome 
remains very much in the balance. The 
election of the maverick Donald Trump 
in America and the Brexit vote in the UK 
were a massive markers along this path. 
All over Europe from the Pirate Party 
in Iceland to Podemos in Spain, new 
and rather odd political formations 
have arisen whilst in others the old 
spectre of fascism has arisen in a new 
garb. There have also been an array of 
social movements which often overlap 
with the new parties to the extent that 
it is difficult to see much difference. 
One problem with describing these is 
that the old labels no longer fit very 
well. In France, Marine Le Pen is often 
described as ‘far-right’ but in fact it 
is her likely opponent in the French 
Presidential elections, Fillon, who 
best fits this label. He would demolish 
the existing labour code, cut public 
expenditure, abolish the wealth tax, 
in short the full neoliberal agenda. 
On economic policy, Le Pen’s Front 
National’s 2012 manifesto contained 
commitments to raise the minimum 
wage and lower the retirement age to 
60, reduce energy prices and taxes, 
introduce trade barriers along with 
measures designed to help small rather 
than big business, and give priority 
to French nationals in employment. 
Essentially, left-wing protectionism plus 
hostility to immigrants. In many ways, 
Trump offers the same kind of mix. 
Of course, pessimists would suggest 
that another name for this kind of 
combination is national socialism.
One more quote from 1979 to 
suggest that this political disarray is not 
unique:Figure 1Source: Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, E. Saez, June 2015
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We are paradoxically in a 
situation where the richness and 
diversity of the left has outrun the 
political concepts that we possess 
to handle their coordination, mutual 
support and unification around 
common political objectives.10
Just why have we reached this 
parlous state? In a previous article, 
we quoted Zygmunt Bauman11:
We could describe what is going 
on at the moment as a crisis of 
democracy, the collapse of trust: 
the belief that our leaders are not 
just corrupt or stupid, but inept. 
Action requires power, to be able 
to do things, and we need politics, 
which is the ability to decide what 
needs to be done. But that marriage 
between power and politics in 
the hands of the nation state has 
ended. Power has been globalized, 
but politics is as local as before. 
Politics has had its hands cut off. 
People no longer believe in the 
democratic system because it 
doesn’t keep its promises. We see 
this, for example, with the migration 
crisis: it’s a global phenomenon, 
but we still act parochially. Our 
democratic institutions were not 
designed for dealing with situations 
of interdependence. The current 
crisis of democracy is a crisis of 
democratic institutions.12
Thus Europeans and Americans 
hear their national leaders say that 
they will resolve the refugee crisis, 
stop terrorism, provide more jobs, 
control the banks, increase economic 
growth… And then they don’t. As a 
consequence they turn to parties or 
social movements disguised as parties 
which at least hold out the promise of 
action even though, as with Syriza in 
Greece, they prove unable to do this. 
In America, Trump based his campaign 
on exactly this self-proclaimed ability 
to get things done.
Some observers believe that the 
current turmoil presages the final 
collapse of capitalism. For example, 
Paul Mason13 predicts that the spread 
of information technology, in particular 
the internet, will create an entirely 
new form of society whilst Wolfgang 
Streeck14 suggests that democracy 
will inevitably master a weak and 
failing capitalist system. However, 
both views seem to rely heavily on a 
version of the old Marxist tradition of 
capitalism failing because of internal 
contradictions rather than the actions 
of any agency, a new kind of economic 
determinism. It is difficult to see the 
new hegemony which might arise from 
the collapse of neoliberalism; certainly 
a return to what we have called welfare 
hegemony seems unlikely, particularly 
as pillars of international order such as 
the International Monetary Fund and 
the Economic Union seem wedded 
to neoliberalism. On the other hand, 
formation of what may be called in 
Gramscian terms a counter-hegemony 
is also difficult to envisage. The historic 
bloc required to achieve such requires 
a complex set of alliances which 
go beyond the simple proletariat/
peasantry duality of Gramsci’s time. 
In particular it must include alliances 
with refugees displaced by war and 
famine as well as with the mostly 
young protesters in such as the 
Occupy movement which erupted 
after the 2008 financial crisis. It also 
has to take into account the growing 
international importance of countries 
such as China and Russia which were 
effectively excluded in any hegemonic 
settlement in previous eras because of 
the simple capitalist/communist duality 
which prevailed. It is difficult to foresee 
other than turmoil as the EU enters a 
period of crisis and Donald Trump 
does, well, whatever Donald Trump is 
going to do.
Unfortunately in this troubled time, 
your correspondent’s local choir has 
little to offer save a song based upon 
a quote from Martin Luther King “We 
may have all come on different ships, 
but we're in the same boat now.” 
Perhaps the best commentary comes 
from a prophet of a past era, our 
current Nobel Literature laureate:
Come writers and critics
Who prophesize with your pen
And keep your eyes wide
The chance won’t come again
And don’t speak too soon
For the wheel’s still in spin
And there’s no tellin’ who that it’s 
namin’
For the loser now will be later to win
For the times they are a-changin’
Come mothers and fathers
Throughout the land
And don’t criticize
What you can’t understand
Your sons and your daughters
Are beyond your command
Your old road is rapidly agin’
Please get out of the new one if you 
can’t lend your hand
For the times they are a-changin’15 ■
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